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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE PAYMENT
TO RELOCATE UTILITIES
The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 provided that when a
State paid for the cost of relocating utility facilities, Federal
funds could be used to reimburse the State in the same propor-
tion that Federal funds were expended on the overall highway
project, provided that such State payment violated neither State
law nor contracts between the State and the Utility. To take
advantage of these Federal funds, numerous States, including
Nebraska, enacted legislation authorizing such State payment. In
1958, however, such legislation was tested in the courts of three
States, and found unconstitutional in both Tennessee and New
Mexico. -In the following comment, the stuaent author examines
these cases, analyses the pertinent arguments, and evaluates the
constitutionality of the Nebraska statute.
The Editors
I. INTRODUCTION
Extensive Federal aid on a share basis to construct highways
has prompted states to take measures to obtain the greatest amount
of aid possible. One facet of the Federal road building legislation
calls for reimbursement of utility companies for relocating their
facilities along Federal Highway rights-of-way. To secure Fed-
eral funds available for this purpose, a number of states, since
1956, passed enabling statutes permitting the expenditure of state
money for this purpose. The constitutionality of these acts was
first questioned in Minneapolis Gas Company v. Zimmerman,' de-
cided in July of 1958. Within six months after the Minnesota case
holding the statute of that state constitutional, State of Tennessee
ex rel. Leech v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.2 and State Highway
Commission of New Mexico v. Southern Union Gas Co.3 were de-
cided. The later cases struck down the enabling statutes, holding
them to be repugnant to state constitutional provisions preventing
the state from giving or lending its credit in aid of private indi-
viduals or corporations.
I Minneapolis Gas Company v. Zimmerman, - Minn. -, 91 N.W.2d 642
(1958).
2 State of Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., -
Tenn. -, 319 S.W.2d 90 (1958). Rehearing denied, 319 S.W.2d 94.
3 State Highway Commission of New Mexico v. Southern Union Gas Co.,
64 N.M. -, 332 P.2d 1007 (1958).
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II. BACKGROUND
The Federal-aid Highway Act 4 passed by Congress in 1956
creates a network of 41,000 miles of interstate and defense high-
ways to be constructed by the several states, but paid for by Fed-
eral funds in the minimum amount of ninety per cent of the total
construction cost. The act also provides for the construction of
secondary and primary roads. As part of the construction cost,
the Federal act specifically provides that a utility-whether pub-
licly, privately, or cooperatively owned-which in the course of
such highway construction, is required to change the location of
any of its facilities on the right-of-way shall be paid the nonbetter-
ment cost of such relocation out of Federal funds.5 The act was
amended in 1958 to require states to submit proof of payment of re-
location costs before being eligible for Federal aid.6
A number of states,7 including Nebraska, in order to qualify
for Federal reimbursement for relocation costs upon Federal-aid
4 70 Stat. 374 (1956), 23 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
G 70 Stat. 383 (1956), 23 U.S.C. § 162 (1958) which provides:
"(a) Subject to the conditions contained in this section, whenever
ever a State shall pay for the cost of relocation of utility facilities ne-
cessitated by the construction of a project on the Federal-aid primary
or secondary systems or on the Interstate System, including extensions
thereof within urban areas, Federal funds may be used to reimburse
the State for such cost in the same proportion as Federal funds are
expended on the project; Provided, that Federal funds shall not be
apportioned to the States under this section when the payment to the
utility violates the law of the State or violates a legal contract between
the utility and the State.
"(b) For the purposes of this section, the term 'utility' shall in-
clude publicly, privately, and cooperatively owned utilities.
"(c) For the purposes of this section, the term 'cost of relocation'
shall include the entire amount paid by such utility properly attribu-
table to such relocation after deducting therefrom any increase in the
value of the new facility and any salvage value derived from the old
facility."
G 72 Stat. 95 (1958) added to paragraph (a), note 2 supra., the following:
"Provided further, that such reimbursement shall be made only
after evidence satisfactory to the Secretary shall have been presented
to him substantiating the fact that the State has paid such cost from
its own funds with respect to Federal-aid highway projects for which
Federal funds are obligated subsequent to the date of ehactment of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 for work, including relocation of util-'
ity facilities."
7 A summary of the states' action is found in U.S. Code Cong. and Adm.
News, 85th Cong., 2d Session, pp. 744-746 (1958).
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highways within their borders, have found it necessary to enact
enabling legislation to meet the conditions and terms prescribed
by Congress. The Nebraska statute,8 similar to those in other
states, provides for the payment to utilities of the nonbetterment
cost of relocating their facilities when such relocation is made ne-
cessary in furtherance of the Federal road construction program.
At common law, utility companies are required to relocate
their facilities, which are located within public highways by per-
mission and license of the state, at their own expense whenever
public health, safety or convenience require change to be made.9
The Legislature may however make provisions for the future rec-
ognition of claims for damages founded on equity and justice, al-
though such claims would otherwise be damnum absque injuria
and unenforceable against the state.10 With this common law back-
ground in mind, the Legislatures of the several states considered
the passage of reimbursement acts to pay utility companies to re-
locate their facilities.
The constitutionality of a state enabling act providing for re-
imbursement of utility companies for relocation expenses was first
litigated in the Minnesota case of Minneapolis Gas Company v.
s Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1304.02 (Supp. 1957). State highways; Federal aid;
relocation of public utilities; cost. If any projects are undertaken by
virtue of the Legislative assent given by section 39-1304.01, it shall be
on condition that whenever any utility facility which now is, or here-
after may be located in, over, along, or under any highway or urban
extension thereof which is a part of the National System of Interstate
and Defense Highways as defined in the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1956, and qualifying for aid as an interstate and defense highway or
urban extension thereof under such federal act, the cost of such altera-
tion, change, moving, or relocation, and the expense of acquiring lands,
or any rights and interests in land or any other rights acquired to ac-
complish such alteration, change, moving, or relocation, shall be paid
by the state as a part of the expense of such federally aided projects
except when such payment to the utility would violate a legal contract
between the utility and the state, or between the utility and a county,
city, or village of the state, under the express terms of which contract
the utility specifically agrees to pay or assume such costs of alteration,
change, moving, or relocation after deducting therefrom any increase
in value of the new facility and any salvage value derived from the old
facility.
9 Detroit Edison Co. v. City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 348, 51 N.W.2d 245
(1952); Jamaica Water Supply Co. v. New York, 280 App. Div. 834, 114
N.Y.S.2d 79, affirmed 304 N.Y. 917, 110 N.E.2d 739 (1915); 12 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations §§ 34.74,34.77 (3rd ed. 1950).
10 Oswego & Syracuse R. Co. v. State, 226 N.Y. 351, 124 N.E. 8 (1919).
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Zimmerman." The court held that the Minnesota statute did not
violate the state constitution by diverting funds for a non-highway
purpose' 2; by authorizing the expenditure of funds for a private
purpose'3 ; by contracting debts for works of internal improve-
ment14; by granting to a corporation a special or exclusive privi-
lege, immunity, or franchise' 5 ; or by impairing the obligation of a
contract.'
III. RELOCATION AS A NECESSARY HIGHWAY COST
In holding that the reimbursement act did not violate the
Minnesota constitutional prohibition against the diversion of cer-
tain funds for non-highway purposes, the court was aided by the
broad definition of a highway which was set down in Cater v.
Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co.1 7  and followed in Minneapolis Gas
Co. v. Zimmerman.8 The court said:
Clearly since the Cater decision in 1895, Minnesota has been
definitely committed to the view that the use of rights-of-way
by utilities for locating their facilities is one of the proper and
primary purposes for which highways are designed even though
their principal use is for travel and the transportation of persons
and property.
The court then held that nonbetterment relocation costs are a
normal and necessary part of highway construction and recon-
11 - Minn. -, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958). The plaintiff-utility company brought
the action for declaratory relief adjudging the reimbursement act to be
constitutional and for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the
Commissioner of Highways to ascertain the cost of relocating utility fa-
cilities, to certify the costs thereof to the bureau of roads and to pay
the cost out of state highway funds in a sum which would not exceed
the amount on which the Federal government based its reimbursement
to the state for such relocation. The division engineer of the U.S. Pub-
lic Roads Administration had approved Federal aid for the project sub-
ject to the condition that the state certify by an attorney general's opin-
ion or court decision that payment by the state to the utility company
does not violate the law of the state or a legal contract with the gas
company in existence at the time the project was approved for Federal
participation.
12 Minn. Const. art. 16, §§ 2, 6.
13 Minn. Const. art. 9, §§ 1, 10.
14 Minn. Const. art. 9, § 5.
15 Minn. Const. art. 4, § 33.
10 Minn. Const. art. 1, § 11; U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
17 60 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. 111 (1895).
Is - Minn. -, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958).
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struction costs which might properly be paid out of the highway
fund. An opposite view was taken by the court of Maine' 9 in an-
swer to a question propounded by the Senate to the justices relat-
ing to the constitutionality of that state's statute 20 authorizing re-
imbursement of utilities for relocation costs prior to its passage.
The Maine court held that an act reimbursing utilities for reloca-
tion costs was constitutional, but funds used for payment of the
company would have to come from a source other than the high-
way fund. The court said:
We do not commonly consider that a power company in
erecting a pole line or a water district in laying a pipe in a high-
way is constructing a highway. To an even lesser degree would
we consider the construction of a pole line or a water pipe across
country to be the construction or reconstruction of a highway,
although the reason for the relocation was occasioned solely by
changes in the highway.
The New Hampshire court, in answer to the same question pro-
pounded by the Senate, was of the opinion the Legislature, if it
chooses to do so, may validly declare that relocation of utility fa-
cilities is a part of the cost of highway relocation and construction
and shall be paid out of highway funds.2 1 The act was not passed.22
IV. PUBLIC PURPOSE ARGUMENTS
The definition of a highway is also important in considering
whether or not the expenditure of funds by the state to reimburse
utility companies for relocation of their facilities along highway
rights-of-way is in violation of constitutional provisions prohibit-
ing a state from lending or giving its credit in aid of individuals,
associations or corporations. 23 Historically, the establishment and
maintenance of highways has been considered a governmental
function that serves and benefits the citizens of a state as a body.2 4
If the relocation of utilities can be properly considered as the con-
struction of a highway or a necessary incident thereto, there is
19 Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 449, 132 A.2d 440 (1957).
20 23 Rev. Stat. Maine § 23A (Supp. 1957).
21 Opinion of the Justices, - N.H. -, 132 A.2d 613 (1957).
22 U.S. Code, Cong. & Adm. News, 85th Cong., 2d Session 746 (1958).
23 Nebraska Constitution, Art. XIII, § 3 (Reissue 1956) is similar to provi-
sions found in other state constitutions. It provides: "The credit of
the state shall never be given or loaned in aid of any individual, asso-
ciation, or corporation."
24 Minneapolis Gas Company v. Zimmerman, - Minn. -, 91 N.W.2d 642
(1958).
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little doubt that expenditure of tax funds for such purpose does
not amount to a giving or lending of a state's credit to a private
corporation. Under the broad Minnesota definition of a highway,
the cost of relocating utility facilities is a fortiori an expenditure
for a public purpose, since highway construction is a governmental
function and highways are designed to be used by utilities.
Maine,25 New Mexico, 26 Georgia,2 7 and Tennessee 28 took the view
that the cost of utility relocation was not a necessary expense of
constructing highways and was not an expenditure for a public
purpose as such. The Nebraska definition of a road29 means a
public way "for the purposes of vehicular travel, including the
entire area within the right-of-way."
The court in State of Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co.30 followed the test promulgated by its earlier case
of Bedford County Hosp. v. Browning.31 The court said the test
to determine whether a statute violates the section of the constitu-
tion regarding the giving or lending of the state's credit to anyone
of the prohibited classes is not the authorization or retention of
title by the state, but rather the right to use by the state for its
benefit. Since the state did not have the ". . . right of use . . ." of
the facilities, the court concluded that reimbursement for adjust-
ing or removing the utility facilities from publicly owned rights-
of-way so that a state highway may be improved "is primarily for
the benefit of subscribers of utilities or their stockholders, and is
neither a state nor a public purpose". A state's right to use the
object of a public expenditure was also a test applied in the New
Mexico 32 and Georgia3 3 cases.
Additional arguments that expenditure of public funds for re-
location of utility facilities is an expenditure for a public purpose
exist even if the relocation cannot be considered a valid expense
25 Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 449, 132 A.2d 440 (1957).
26 State Highway Commission of New Mexico v. Southern Union Gas Co.,
64 N.M. -, 332 P.2d 1007 (1958).
27 Mulkey v. McQuilliam, 213 Ga. 507, 100 S.E.2d 268 (1957).
28 State of Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Southern Bell. Tel. & Tel. Co., -
Tenn. -, 319 S.W.2d 90 (19'58). Rehearing denied, 319 S.W.2d 94.
20 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1304.02 (Supp. 1957).
30 State of Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Southern Bell Tel. & TeL Co., -
Tenn. -, 319 S.W.2d 90 (1958). Rehearing denied, 319 S.W.2d 94.
31 189 Tenn. 227, 225 S.W.2d 41 (1949).
32 Supra, note 22.
33 Supra, note 23.
COMMENTS
of highway construction. The Minnesota court cited these
reasons: 34
1. The realities of the situation are that the people of Min-
nesota would suffer economically if the state failed to take
advantage of Federal aid made available to the privately and
municipally owned utilities of this state....
2. If the utilities located in this state must undertake reloca-
tion of their facilities without a right to reimbursement, their
costs will be substantially increased and this in turn will be re-
flected in higher utility rates in Minnesota communities.
3. To the extent that other states effectuate Federal aid to
their utilities and Minnesota does not, the people of Minnesota
will be paying Federal taxes which will benefit the people of the
other states but which will not benefit the people of Minnesota.
Securing Federal aid as a public purpose for the expenditure of
state funds is open to some argument. Since utility companies
have a common law duty to relocate their facilities when neces-
sary, it might be said that not only are Federal funds being spent
unnecessarily, but also state funds are being likewise used.
Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania P.U. Comm.,3  gave
this illustration of serving a state purpose by expenditure of funds
to secure Federal aid:
... Thus, if state 'A' receives from the Federal government
90% of the cost of other utility relocations on interstate highways
because the policy of that state is to bear this cost, while state 'B'
receives nothing from the Federal government for utility reloca-
tions because its policy is not to bear this cost, the citizens of
state 9B' will pay on their utility bills for utility relocations in
their state, and will also pay in their Federal gasoline tax for a
part of the cost of relocating utilities in state 'A'.
This argument is attractive in states that receive Federal aid in a
greater proportion than its citizens pay in Federal taxes, but in
states that are receiving a lesser amount of Federal aid, the citi-
zens are paying for the relocation of utilities in other states any-
way, and it could conceivably be to the advantage of the state to
pass up the Federal aid and require their utility companies to do
their common law duty.
That the interests of the utility customers was a primary con-
sideration in the passage of the Federal provisions providing for
reimbursement of utility companies for relocating their facilities
34 Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, - Minn. -, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958).
35 Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania P.U. Comm., 185 Pa. Super.
1, 136 A.2d 473 (1957).
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is apparent from debates -on the topic.36 Generally, utility users
and the public that uses the highways compose the same group.
But when broken down to specific companies, it is apparent that
some inequity may arise where a small local company along an
interstate right-of-way has to pay the costs of relocating its facili-
ties. Where a large company dominates a state, a utility user and
a taxpayer begin to lose their identity and for practical purposes
it makes little difference if the public pays for the relocation in
the form of higher utility rates or higher taxes. Under a broad
view such as adopted by Minnesota and apparently considered by
Congress, relocation expenditures can be readily justified as
expenditures for a public purpose. New Mexico, Georgia and
Tennessee tend to a narrower view of what is a public purpose
and look to the company, a private, profit making corporation, as
receiving the benefit rather than the user who must ultimately
bear the cost.
A. Public Purpose In Nebraska.
Nebraska is apparently committed to a broad definition of a
public purpose. In its first case3" construing Article XIII, § 3, of
the Constitution of Nebraska, the court stated:
It is the province of the Legislature to determine matters of
policy. In appropriating the public funds, if there is reason for
doubt or argument as to whether the purpose for which the ap-
propriation is made is a public or a private purpose, and reason-
able men might differ in regard to it, it is generally held that the
matter is for the Legislature; and to our minds this is the only
reasonable conclusion.
In United Community Services v. The Omaha Nat. Bank,38 the
court stated that legislation authorizing a public power district to
contribute its funds for charitable or eleemosynary purposes did
not violate the constitutional prohibition against giving or lending
the credit of the state in aid of a private individual or corporation.
36 102 Cong. Rec. 7207-7211 (1956). It is interesting to note that Minnesota
lobbiests and Congressmen were instrumental in passage of the Federal
Act.
37 Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, 73 Neb. 66, 105 N.W. 716 (1905). Cf.
Power Oil Co. v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 827, 295 N.W. 805 (1941); State ex
rel. Douglas County v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556, 74 N.W. 59 (1898); State ex
rel. Custer County Agricultural Society & Live Stock Exchange v.
Robinson, 35 Neb. 401, 53 N.W. 213 (1892).
3s 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1956).
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The court quoted, with approval, the following from Hager,
Auditor v. Kentucky Children's Home Society.3 9
These authorities clearly settle that the vital point in all
such appropriations is whether the purpose is public; and that, if
it is, it does not matter whether the agency through which it is
dispensed is public or not; that the appropriation is not made for
the agency, but for the object which it serves; the test is in the
end, not in the means.
Certainly, as indicated by Congressional debate and the contrary
decisions, the constitutionality of state reimbursement of utility
costs in relocating facilities along Federal highway rights-of-way
is a question upon which reasonable men could differ, and might
be considered properly left to the Legislature. By looking to the
end rather than the means, it is possible the Nebraska court may
use reasoning similar to that in Minneapolis Gas Company v.
Zimmerman" and hold Nebraska's reimbursement statute4 ' con-
stitutional. In the case of electrical power facilities, the argument
is stronger for constitutionality since the state's electrical power
is entirely generated by public power companies. In State v.
Love,42 the court said: "Section 3, art. XII (now XIII) of the con-
stitution, was intended to prevent the state from extending its
credit to private enterprises."
V. COSTS OF RELOCATION
The considerable expense of relocating utility facilities was
also noted in the Tennessee decision.43 The court said:
The bill charges that in order to participate in the interstate
highway program, it was necessary for the State to appropriate
and raise large sums of money, necessitating the enactment of
Chapter 264, Public Acts of 1957, authorizing the State Funding
Board to issue bonds in the amount not exceeding $30,000,000.00;
that the department has estimated that the cost of relocating util-
ity facilities in connection with interstate highway projects in
Tennessee will amount to $15,370,000.00, which is more than one
half of the amount which the Legislature authorized the State to
borrow for highway purposes under said Chapter 264, Public Acts
of 1957.
39 119 Ky. 235, 83 S.W. 605 (1904).
40 - Mnn. -, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958).
41 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1304.02 (Supp. 1957).
42 89 Neb. 149, 131 N.W. 196 (1911).
43 State of Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
Tenn. -, 319 S.W.2d 90 (1958). Rehearing denied, 319 S.W.2d 94.
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The New Mexico court might very well have given some considera-
tion to the expense involved in relocating utility facilities since
the New Mexico statute44 authorizes such aid on Federal aid pri-
mary and secondary systems as well as the interstate system. The
Nebraska45 and Minnesota 46 statutes authorize relocation reim-
bursement only on interstate highway projects. Tennessee also
has a statute providing for relocation reimbursement on Federal-
aid primary and secondary system highways.47 Of the sixteen re-
location laws passed by the end of 1957, nine relate only to projects
on the Interstate system,48 six relate to all Federal-aid projects, 49
and one relates to all state maintained highways.5" The laws of
Massachusetts and Illinois gave the highway authorities discretion
in the matter of whether or not the utilities should be paid for re-
locating facilities. Nebraska and North Dakota have specifically
made reimbursement subject to existing contracts between the
utilities and the state or local governments. Only New Mexico
and Texas provided that existing contracts are not a bar to pay-
ment, but it is apparent from the language of the laws of the other
states that such contracts are not an obstacle to reimbursement. 51
The Federal-aid primary and Federal-aid secondary systems, by
definition52 are quite comprehensive while the interstate system is
limited to 41,000 miles within the continental United States. The
Federal government pays ninety per cent of the cost and the state,
ten per cent of the cost of constructing interstate system highways.
Federal aid is on a fifty-fifty matching basis for Federal-aid pri-
mary and Federal-aid secondary roads. The expense of relocating
utility facilities along the interstate route will be much smaller
than that required to relocate facilities under all three systems.
VI. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
An argument that it is for the Legislature to determine what
are and what are not compensable damages, was rejected by the
44 N.Mex. Stat. § 55-7-18 (Supp. 1957).
45 Supra, note 38.
46 12 Minn. Stat. § 161.134 (Supp. 1957).
47 Tenn. Code § 54.544 (Supp. 1958).
48 Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma and Texas.
49 Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, Tennessee and Utah.
50 Connecticut.
51 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News, 85th Cong., 2d Session 746 (1958).
52 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1953).
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New Mexico court.53 The court said that to say relocation expense
could be classified as damages and that the state could then pay
such "damages", would permit the circumvention of the constitu-
tion by a "play on words." The court said they could see no bene-
fit accruing to the state, no quid pro quo, as found to exist in their
earlier case of White v. Board of Education of Silver City.54
The Minnesota court, in Minneapolis Gas Company v. Zimmer-
man55 said the classification made in the reimbursement act is ger-
mane to the purpose of that law, "which was to obtain for the citi-
zens of Minnesota the full benefits accruing from Federal legisla-
tion and from being connected with a national system of interstate
and defense highways", thus rejecting an argument that the law
was contrary to a constitutional provision: 6 which prohibits the
passage of local or special laws. The Minnesota court listed two
reasons for holding there was no merit in a contention that the re-
imbursement act contravened the state57 and Federal5" constitu-
tional prohibitions against the impairment of the obligation of con-
tracts. They said there was no impairment of contract since only
the state and the utility were affected and no third parties acquired
any rights under or pursuant to the contract and that all contracts
made by the state are entered into subject to the implied condition
that they are always subordinate to a reasonable and proper ex-
ercise of the state's inalienable police power.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether or not a state act providing reimbursement for reloca-
tion of utility facilities contravenes a constitutional prohibition
against the lending or giving of state aid to a private corporation
depends mainly upon the perspective from which a court chooses
to view the problem. If the problem is viewed from an "ends"
rather than a "means" standpoint, the court might find the act con-
stitutional. If the court chooses to look no further than the corpo-
ration that is receiving the payment, it is possible that the act will
be found unconstitutional. The size of the sum of money a state
53 State Highway Commission of New Mexico v. Southern Union Gas Co.,
64 N.M. -, 332 P.2d 1007 (1958).
54 42 N.M. 94, 75 P.2d 712 (1935).
55 - Minn. -, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958).
56 Minn. Const. art. 4, § 33.
57 Minn. Const. art. 1, § 11.
58 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
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may be obligated to pay under its reimbursement act may also
have some influence upon a court. Under Nebraska's past view of
what constitutes a "public purpose", it is probably unlikely that the
Nebraska reimbursement statute will be declared unconstitutional.5 9
Roger A. Langenheim, '60
59 A recent opinion by Harold S. Salter, Nebraska Assistant Attorney
General assigned to the Department of Roads, supports a conclusion
that the Nebraska Supreme Court will likely find the Nebraska re-
location statute constitutional. Of the Tennessee court's attempt to
distinguish its earlier case of Bedford County Hospital v. Browning,
note 31, supra., the opinion states: "It is difficult to follow the reason-
ing and see why the hospital situation and other previous authorities
cited are distinguishable from a utility situation. This results in a
weakening of the case and greatly strengthens the position taken in
a strong dissenting opinion . . ." Opp. Neb. Atty. Gen., No. 21 (1959).
